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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [SNAR](#) [ASEC](#) [AF](#)
SUBJECT: A COURSE OF ACTION TO REBALANCE THE ANP
CORRECTED VERSION

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A)KABUL 01884

11. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Course of Action plan outlined below is designed as a guide for implementing President Karzais decision to re-balance the Afghan National Police in order to address pressing security issues in the south (reftel). This outline will be used by members of the international community involved with building up the ANP to assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) staff to plan and execute this rebalancing exercise. END SUMMARY.

12. (SBU) BACKGROUND AND SCOPE.

The need to re-balance the Police Operating Forces became clear in the course of a series of provincial assessment studies, conducted by NSA Rassoul with input from the security Ministries and members of the international community. It was reinforced by concerns raised by several governors, specifically the Governors of Kandahar and Helmand, to President Karzai. Once the need to rebalance the police force became apparent, several Courses of Action were developed and briefed to President Kazai on April 21, 2006. He agreed that something needed to be done and selected our preferred Course of Action which would initially use the Afghan Highway Polices personnel and equipment to increase the strength of the Uniform, Border, and Stand-By Police. This rebalancing will take place in conjunction with the necessary pay and rank reforms, as well as the activation of Police Regional

Commands, to better address immediate security concerns. However, the Course of Action will not cover overall Ministry of Interior missions or manning in Kabul.

¶3. (SBU) MISSION STATEMENT. Assist the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan in developing and executing plans to re-balance and re-distribute its police forces to meet urgent security concerns, establish Police Regional Commands and Staffs, and implement national level reform programs during the remainder of CY 2006.

¶4. (SBU) COURSE OF ACTION DESIGN.

¶A. Overview. Re-balancing is designed to improve the distribution of Afghan Police Forces nationally, by moving them from locations and missions where they are not as urgently needed to areas and missions where the need is greater. Specifically, by moving police to the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, and from the Afghan Highway Police to the Uniform, Stand-By and Border Police, overall national stability and civil security should be improved. This Course of Action cannot be successful without proper political support: it must have the weight of President Karzais authority in writing to ensure that all who must plan and execute the re-balancing actions understand the urgency of the situation. This effort will be directed according to guiding principles from the national level with Afghans, assisted by the international community. However, much of the detailed execution will be completed by the new Police Regional Commands, with mentorship from the Regional Police

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Advisory Teams (RPATs). We expect to begin re-balancing efforts by May 15, 2006, and complete these initial actions by September 1, 2006. Ultimately, these re-balancing efforts will form the basis of developing a future Tashkil (Afghan staffing pattern) that better reflects threats and population demands on Afghan security forces.

¶B. President of Afghanistan Decision Directive (PDD) Minimum Elements. To ensure the proper emphasis behind this task, a Presidential Decision Directive from President Karzai is necessary. It will focus our efforts, assist in further developing our guiding principles and provide sustaining motivation in a process that will undoubtedly be difficult and sometimes frustrating. Therefore, we will work to ensure that this PDD addresses as a minimum the following elements:

- 1) the Ministry of Interior must re-balance to meet urgent security needs;
- 2) the Afghan Highway Police must be the initial source of personnel and resources to accomplish the re-balancing requirements;
- 3) the Ministry of Interior must implement its selected Course of Action without delay.

¶C. Guiding Principles. Because execution of this plan will be a joint effort between the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the international community combined with de-centralized tasks to the Police Regional Commands, some guiding principles must be established nationally to ensure that purpose and intent are properly understood and efficiently executed. Highlighted below is our list of guiding principles for re-balancing the Afghan National Police in CY 2006.

- i. Re-Balancing activities must be properly recorded and captured in future Tashkils. One of

the reasons this re-balancing effort is currently needed is because of the inadequacies of current and past Tashkils. The development of future Tashkils must include a process to match security forces and resources to law enforcement and security needs based on population and threat.

-ii. The future Tashkil must be modified by better threat and population studies IAW thorough Provincial Assessments. The international community and the MOI need to pick a single standard to assess threat and population to prevent multiple views on where the re-balancing of forces is to occur.

-iii. All fills should be accomplished using the principle of closest to home assignment first. Because of the nature of Afghan society, it is counter-productive to move personnel long distances away from their homes and families to meet police manning requirements. Coupled with a lack of electronic banking that would allow individual police to send their pay home to families, moving personnel without regard to places of origin would only result in poor recruiting and an increase in severance from the police forces. Therefore, our efforts should emphasize volunteering over forced moves.

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-iv. This Course of Action and any other will be affected by pay and rank reform over time and require those efforts take into account the re-balancing actions.

-v. All personnel should move to new assignments with assigned weapons and personal equipment. This will provide for immediate capability upon reaching a new duty assignment. The gaining police unit will record and document the the weapons and equipment of all arriving personnel.

-vi. The MOI should identify which highway security missions previously performed by the AHP should be maintained. These missions should be justified by historical analysis, such as reviews of arrest records and reports of attacks on commercial and private vehicles by Anti-Coalition Militias. Highway areas assessed as having a high risk of attack should retain security protection, but performed by the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Stand-By Police or Afghan Border Police, whichever is more appropriate.

-vii. All Afghan Highway Police personnel, except for a small caretaker staff of senior leaders, must volunteer for new positions or elect to resign from the Afghan National Police altogether.

-viii. To minimize the number of AHP personnel to reassign, and to prevent the mission from growing, the MOI will be pressed to halt all AHP recruiting now.

-ix. Adjust all Afghan National Police fielding ing and logistics support plans to support this Course of Action.

-x. Develop public information programs to highlight the major fielding initiatives,

inauguration of Regional Commands and significant personnel re-assignment actions. Start by conducting an inaugural ceremony on May 15, 2006, at the Kandahar Police Regional Training Center that covers activation of Regional Command South, and includes a major display of vehicles, weapons, uniforms and equipment that will be fielded immediately to the Afghan National Police in Kandahar Province.

-xi. Quote Proper Demographic Representation
Unquote is the basic model used to focus recruiting policies for this effort. Its basic tenets are listed below.

-1. Quote Proper Demographic Representation
Unquote was emphasized as a method of conducting business by President Karzai and applies to all types of police, placing special emphasis on operational effectiveness achieved by establishing a presence and understanding with the community in which the police operate.

-2. Quote Proper Demographic

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Representation Unquote consists of three major components: a) maintaining ethnic balance in all police units, promotions, and assignments - for the Afghan Uniform Police this must be done at the district level and must be a goal of the current plan, and for Afghan Border Police and Afghan Stand-By Police this must be done at least at the regional level when feasible; b) fill police ranks, especially the local Afghan Uniformed Police, first through local recruiting, which makes it easier and should maintain proper local ethnic mix if executed fairly; c) ensure that properly equipped police maintain a presence in the areas they are responsible for and seek to achieve understanding and trust with the local population.

-3. Do not over-recruit in any one particular area to fill other areas or in any one particular ethnic group, already an often-stated concern.

-4. Recruiting should use threat study and population analysis reports, accepted by the GOA and the international community.

1D. Timeline. The initial timeline for executing this Course of Action is as follows. Further timing details will be developed by the International Community and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.

-15 May 06: RC-South established with Regional Police Advisory Team (RPAT).

-27 May 06: Commence Force Re-Balancing; Regional Command- South ceremony with RC-South Commander and Staff, Senior MOI representatives, and local Afghans as well as International Press Coverage format for subsequent events.

-01 Jun 06: Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion deploys to RC-South permanently from RC-North; provides for two permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalions in RC-South.

-15 Jun 06: Phase I Pay Reform begins for the Afghan National Police.

-01 Jun 06: Rank Reform Phase III complete for all of the Afghan National Police.

-01 Aug 06: All Afghan Border Police Re-Balance actions are complete.

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-01 Sep 06: Total Afghan National Police Re-Balance actions are complete.

-15 Sep 06: Institute Phase II Pay Reform for all of the Afghan National Police.

1E. Fill Requirements, Priorities, and Strategies. Because each part of the Afghan National Police has different requirements a standard strategy or fill method cannot be used. This is because in the case of the Afghan Uniform Police, the current Tashkil

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inadequately documents security requirements in RC-South. Additionally, the current Tashkil does not determine which police structures should be filled first in a resource-constrained environment. Therefore the following fill strategies will be used.

-i. Fill Strategies by Type of Police.

-1. Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). Fill according to the provinces with the highest threat and lowest ratio of police to the general population. Use only the four highest threat provinces and fill to a level that will bring these provinces online with ratios in provinces that have a low threat risk.

-a. Kandahar: current need is approximately 800 policemen.

-b. Helmand: current need is approximately 600 policemen.

-c. Uruzgan: current need is approximately 150 policemen.

-d. Paktika: current need is approximately 300 policemen.

-2. Afghan Stand-By Police (ASP). Because Afghan Stand-By Police are a regional asset, they should be filled by region starting with the Province with the overall highest threat and lowest police to population ratio. Using that thought process listed below are the actions and fill priorities for the Afghan Stand-By Police.

-a. RC-South.

-i. Move one Afghan Stand-By Police battalion from RC-North (5th Bn in Konduz) permanently to RC-South and man to 100 percent: current need is approximately 140 policemen.

-ii. Fill existing RC South Afghan Stand-By Police battalion to 100 percent (2d Bn in Kandahar): current need is approximately 221 policemen.

-b. Fill remaining Afghan Stand-By 1 remaining Afghan Stand-By Police battalions to 100 percent

-i. ASP Bn in RC Central (6th Bn): current need is approximately 176 policemen.

-ii. ASP Bn in RC East (1st Bn): current need is approximately 372 policemen.

-iii. ASP Bn in RC West: current need is approximately 100 policemen.

-iv. ASP Bn in RC Central (7th Bn): current need is approximately 378 policemen.

-v. ASP Bn in RC Central (8th Bn): current need is approximately 376 policemen.

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-vi. ASP Bn in RC North (4th Bn in MeS): current need is approximately 343 policemen.

-3. Afghan Border Police (ABP). Fill in accordance with the new Tashkil which does adequately describe Border Police requirements.

-a. RC South4th and 5th ABP Bdes: Current shortfall is approximately 1056 policemen.

-b. RC East2nd and 3rd ABP Bdes: Current shortfall is approximately 848 policemen.

-c. RC West6th ABP Bde: Current shortfall is approximately 672 policemen.

-d. RC Central1st ABP Bde: Current .

-QQQd. RC CentralQ1st ABP Bde: Current shortfall is approximately 583 policemen.

-e. RC North7th and 8th Bdes: Current shortfall is approximately 923 policemen.

-ii. Fill (Man, Equip, Train) Priorities from 1 to n.

-1. AUP in Kandahar.

-2. AUP in Helmand.

-3. 5th ASP Battalion with move to RC-South.

-4. 2d ASP Battalion in Kandahar.

-5. 6th ASP Battalion.

-6. AUP in Uruzgan.

-7. AUP in Paktika.

-8. 4th and 5th ABP Brigades in RC-South.

-9. 2nd and 3rd ABP Brigades in RC-East.

-10. 1st ASP Battalion in RC-East.

-11. 6th ABP Brigade in RC-West.

-12. 3rd ASP Battalion in RC-West.

-13. 1st ABP Brigade in RC-Central.

-14. 7th ASP Battalion in RC-Central.

-15. 8th ASP Battalion in RC-Central.

-16. 7th and 8th ABP Brigades in RC-North.

-17. 4th ASP Battalion in RC-North.

-iii. Therefore, the total personnel requirement for all type of police to be re-balanced is approximately 8,038.

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1F. Sourcing Strategies. After identifying the rcing Strategies. After identifying the requirements, the sources to fill those requirements will be defined. There are four major potential sources of manpower to accomplish the re-balancing tasks. All of these are limited by the individual Afghans willingness to serve outside a certain radius of his ancestral homeland. In all of the sources we must first seek volunteers from the existing forces that will give up personnel to other police forces with greater need and attempt to keep the volunteer as close to home as possible.

-i. Afghan Highway Police Manpower. The first manning pool to explore is the Afghan Highway Police. They are currently located in 298 fixed checkpoint locations along the Ring Road and along spur roads that lead to the 12 recognized border crossing points. It currently has approximately 5,945 personnel in the operating forces that could be available for placement in the Uniformed, Border, and Stand-By Police. Given that not all of these personnel will elect to remain as policemen and move e to new jobs and locations, the number available will be something less than 5,945. However, it must be made clear to AHP personnel that they must move to a new police function or lose their job.

-ii. Afghan Security Force (ASF) Recruiting. There are approximately 800 ASF personnel along the Afghan-Pakistan Border that may still want to volunteer for some type of national service. Some of these 800 will want to join the ANA. The remainder may want to joint the ANPpresumably the Border Police first. Therefore, the Afghans must capitalize on the existing programs to de-mobilize the ASF into our high priority requirements in RC-South, most likely 4th and 5th Afghan Border Police Brigades.

-iii. Move Personnel from Over-Manned to Under-Manned Areas. This strategy is the least desirable because it is least likely to be effective. Most Afghan policemen will not volunteer to move long distances away from their current homes. However, the Afghan Uniformed Police is is over-manned, primarily in RC-North, and the Afghans could ask for volunteers to relocate to RC-South where Uniformed Police are under-manned, according to the threat and population studies.

-iv. Local Hire and Send to RTC for Training. The most likely source of manpower after re-assigning AHP personnel is a policy of local hire. If we receive close to 5,900 personnel from re-balancing the Afghan Highway Police, we will need to local hire approximately 2,100 new police of all types in several locationsprimarily in RC-South. However, the Afghans must be prepared to hire locally up to the entire requirement of 8,038 personnel, if needed, in order to ensure re-

balancing does occur.

¶G. Assisted Implementation Phasing. Given that re-balancing will be a difficult task, phasing our efforts will most likely lead to more efficient

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execution. The Afghans must start in the areas of greatest need that have the greatest security issues. This means RC-South must be the focus of initial re-balancing efforts. The other Regional Commands Police Operating Forces will be successively re-balanced on a similar estimate of need. In all of this the MOI will be assisted by those international community organizations and personnel with police expertise. Additionally, the Afghan Regional Commands will be assisted by Regional Police Advisory Teams (RPATs), concerned with the daily planning and execution of re-balancing tasks in the regions and provinces.

-i. Phase 1 starts 15 May 2006. (RC-South)

-1. Establish all of the Regional Commands.

-2. Begin Re-Balancing Tasks in RC-South.

-3. Deploy one Permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion to RC-South (5th ASP Bn); provides for two permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalions in RC-South.

-4. Rank Reform Phase III complete.

-ii. Phase 2 starts 15 June 2006. (Other RCs)

-1. Complete Phase I pay reform.

-2. Take lessons-learned from re-balancing activities in RC-South and apply to the other Regional Commands.

-3. Afghan Border Police reforms completed not later than 01 August 2006.

-4. All re-balancing actions in all of the Regional Commands must be completed not later than 01 September 2006 complies with budgeting demands.

-iii. Phase 3 starts 15 September 2006.

-1. Institute Phase II Pay Reform.

-2. Take lessons-learned from rebalancing coupled with agreed upon Threat and Population Studies and begin to develop a new Tashkil that will capture more realistic Security Forces requirements across Afghanistan.

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